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Abstract 
The paper draws on Siegel (1984) to argue that, while paving the way for constitutionalizing the free market 
in Lochner v. New York (1905), the reproduction cost method that the Supreme Court established in Smyth v. 
Ames (1898) as the preferred technique for assessing the value of a business for regulatory purposes also 
exposed the conventional character of any valuation exercise, against the claims of objectivity made by 
classical economists and mainstream jurists. The inconsistency between recognizing that “value is not a fact” 
and the classical laissez faire philosophy underlying the Court’s jurisprudence did not escape progressive 
critics, who concluded that government could legitimately fine tune regulation in order to affect a business’s 
value and pursue alternative socio-economic goals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In a landmark essay of more than three decades ago, law historian Stephen Siegel explained how 
the legal controversies of the so-called Lochner era – the period of American constitutional 
jurisprudence when the Supreme Court was allegedly dominated by dogmatic laissez faire1 – 
stemmed from the transformation of the American economy from one based on small-scale, 
decentralized, individual businesses to one where large-scale, concentrated, corporate enterprises 
prevailed (Siegel 1984). This paper takes the lead from Siegel’s thesis and investigates the role 
played by the evolving techniques of business evaluation in shaping a major branch of Lochnerian 
jurisprudence, the regulation of railroad rates. While the most immediate effect of this foray of 
economic ideas into legal reasoning was to strengthen the free market penchant of American courts, 
I argue that in hindsight it represented a key moment for the transition from a classical to a 
neoclassical approach to regulation and, more generally, for legitimizing a broader scope for 
government intervention in the economy.  
How to check the railroads’ economic power was one of the thorniest legal and political issues of 
the time. Railways companies charged “what the market will bear” for their transport services, 
thereby extracting huge monopolistic rents from powerless shippers. Government at both federal 
and state level tried to protect the latter by regulating railroad rates. This led to frequent litigation 
between government and the railways companies, with courts called to say the last word on whether 
the proposed regulation complied with the constitutional protection of property. Property rights 
could, and would, be infringed – so the railroads’ argument went – when regulated rates prevented a 
business from earning an adequate return over its invested capital. In short, when owners obtained 
less than the “fair value” of their property. At the core of these litigations lay the elusive concept of 
a business’s “fair value”. Late 19th-century courts had thus to refer to economic theory to identify 
what this truly meant.  
Standard economics offered no easy answer. Scale effects demonstrated that the advent of large-
scale business – in railroads as in any other industry characterized by massive fixed costs – could 
take place thanks to, rather than despite, market forces. The dilemma arose as to what to do in the 
face of the undesirable effects of the free play of market forces. The usual recipe still postulated by 
most orthodox economists – do nothing at all – could even appear counter-productive. In a shocking 
reversal, government intervention was now invoked as a curb against rising monopoly power. By 
                                                 
1 The period, which lasted approximately from the late 1880s to the mid-1930s, owes its name to Lochner v. New York 
(198 US 45, 1905), where the Supreme Court stroke down a New York state statute regulating the working hours of 
bakers. For opposite views on Lochner, see e.g. Kens (1998) and Bernstein (2011). 
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legitimizing rate regulation in a landmark post-Civil War decision, Munn v Illinois,2 the Supreme 
Court had sanctioned the existence of an unreviewable legislative control over prices. That decision 
could well be read as instrumental to protect the classical liberal principles of individualism and 
competition against “the rising tide” of monopoly. Yet, regulation could be hardly reconciled with 
the constitutional protection of property. The Constitution had originally enshrined property as a 
bulwark against the encroachment of individual freedom by government power. This role had been 
reinforced by the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.3 Allowing government too 
much of a free hand against large-scale enterprises could thus lead to undue political domination 
over the economy and, through the economy, the whole of society. The puzzle was further 
complicated by the economists’ lack of agreement on how to handle the endogenous rise of 
economic power in the economy while preserving the classical dogmas of full economic freedom.  
Aware of the multiple and complex sides of the regulatory dilemma, American jurists, whether 
liberal or conservative, endeavored to handle it by redefining no less than the substance of 
constitutional law. According to Siegel (1984, p.260), their preferred response was to 
constitutionalize the free market, thereby paving the way for the so-called laissez faire 
constitutionalism of Lochner v. New York and its heirs. Regulation was therefore not just a branch, 
but the main log of the Lochnerian tree. 
In the following pages, I show how Siegel’s thesis pivots on the peculiar notion of a business’s 
“fair value” that affirmed itself in American courts of the late Gilded Age:4 the value of a business 
was given by its reproduction cost, i.e., by the sum a market entrant would have to pay in order to 
build anew the business itself as an alternative to purchasing the existing one. Though it did not 
fully belong to the tool box of classical economics, the notion was selected precisely because it 
allowed to preserve the gist of the classical message – the superiority of the free market over all 
alternative forms of social organization – while granting legitimacy to regulation. From the 
viewpoint of the history of economics, this was a momentous conclusion. Indeed, it was during the 
heated controversy that surrounded the Supreme Court’s selection of reproduction cost as the 
measure of business value for regulatory purposes that several observers realized the inconsistency 
between a classical approach to economic phenomena, where value was conceived of as a physical, 
objective notion, and a notion of value that necessarily referred to the subjective assessment of 
                                                 
2 94 US 113 (1877). 
3 The first section of the Amendment contained the so-called due process clause: “No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws”. A possible reading of the clause was that the protection it granted to American citizens was 
substantive as well as procedural. This reading would lie at the foundation of the Lochner era. 
4 The Gilded Age is the period of American history between 1870 and 1900, its last decade overlapping with the 
beginning of the so-called Progressive Era. 
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prospective cash outlays. Everybody recognized that value was not a fact – or not anymore – but 
rather an opinion in the evaluator’s mind.  
Looking at the late 19th-century – early 20th-century regulatory saga from a history of economics 
perspective, it turns out that precisely when the laissez faire constitutionalism of Lochner & c. 
reached its zenith, the seeds were cast for the later U-turn in American jurisprudence. If value was 
not a fact, then the door was open for a democratically elected government to proclaim its own 
assessment of a business’s “fair value” and legislate to achieve any political goal – say, a specific 
distribution of wealth – implicit in such evaluation. While the presumptive constitutionality of 
government regulation would only be sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the New Deal,5 it was 
during the earlier controversies over railroad regulation that it became clear to progressive 
interpreters that a wedge could be driven between the classical political economy of the free market 
and the neoclassical economics of value theory, the latter being viewed as a mere set of analytical 
tools that could be applied to pursue any kind of socio-political target independently of the specific 
pattern of economic intercourse envisioned in the former.   
 
 
I. FROM PRESENT VALUE TO REPRODUCTION COST6 
 
Writing for the Supreme Court in an 1893 takings case involving a navigation company (channels 
were at the time second only to railroads in triggering regulatory controversies), and called to 
determine the exact value of “just compensation” for condemned property, Justice David Brewer 
proclaimed the following criterion: “The value of property, generally speaking, is determined by its 
productiveness – the profits which its use brings to the owner. Various elements enter into this 
matter of value. […] The value […] is not determined by the mere cost of construction, but more by 
what the completed structure brings in the way of earnings to its owner. For each separate use of 
one’s property by others the owner is entitled to a reasonable compensation, and the number and 
amount of such uses determines the productiveness and the earnings of the property, and therefore 
largely its value”.7 This was nothing but the modern idea that the value of a business is equal to the 
present value of its future net earnings. Value should not be determined by looking backward at 
                                                 
5 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144 (1938). 
6 This section and the next draw from a companion paper, Giocoli (2017). 
7 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893), at 328. Brewer made another key contribution to 
the jurisprudence on rate regulation: in a series of late 1880s – early 1890s opinions he reframed the issue in terms of 
the takings doctrine, away from the police power realm. The value of property was itself property and thus entitled to 
the same constitutional protection. This clever move transformed regulation from a public welfare concern into a 
property rights problem, i.e., a problem fully within the scope of classical political economy. On the difficult boundary 
between regulation and confiscation and Brewer’s contribution to define it, see Giocoli (2017).   
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production cost, as in classical economics, but by looking forward, in terms of the expected income 
flows a given property could generate.8  
However, notes Siegel (1984, p.221), present value was an ambiguous concept when applied to 
regulatory issues. If it meant the value of an unregulated business, which by definition included its 
ability to gain supra-competitive profits, the purpose of regulation would vanish. Neither could it 
mean its regulated value, i.e., the value resulting from employing regulated rates in the calculation 
of future earnings: in such a case the constitutional protection of property would be dodged by 
basing the permissible rates on the rates already set by legislators. Only one solution existed – and 
American courts did not take long to realize that. 
The proper present value of a business could be no other than the value set by the competitive 
market. Rate regulation was confiscatory when it reduced the overall return of the regulated 
business below that obtainable from an investment of comparable size and risk made in a 
competitive environment. While present value itself was a non-classical notion, using competitive 
markets as a benchmark for “just compensation” rested upon the well-established foundations of 
classical political economy. Both conservative and progressive jurists could invoke the authority of 
Adam Smith and his system of natural liberty to defend the choice as morally, as well as 
economically, grounded.9 It was common at the time to criticize regulatory case law as arbitrary and 
ad hoc. But how could anyone accuse a court of having abused its discretionary powers if its 
decision had been guided by the just light of classical competition? Courts did not miss the golden 
opportunity of an inflow of external authoritativeness in so controversial an issue. 
Under the doctrine of competitive present value, the judicial task was to determine what the value 
of a railroad or public utility would have been if operated in a competitive environment. A difficult 
task again, were it not for the help coming from business and engineering valuation techniques. The 
notion of reproduction cost provided the answer. While the notion had been theoretically developed 
in Henry Carey’s Principles,10 it is very likely that late 19th-century US courts borrowed the idea of 
reproduction, or replacement cost from more mundane sources.  
                                                 
8 It may be worth noting that, as it happened for reproduction cost (see below), even a non-classical notion like present 
value did not enter American jurisprudence through neoclassical economics, but rather through its common use in 
accounting and engineering. For example, the American civil engineer Arthur Mellen Wellington made extensive 
recourse to present value calculations in his well-known 1887 treatise The Economic Theory of the Location of Railways 
(Wellington 1887, Ch. IV). Within neoclassical economics, the method would only affirm itself with Fisher (1907).     
9 Cf. Smith ([1776] 1904, IV.9.51). The moral justification of Smith’s system of natural liberty – a system based on 
strong property rights and free competition – transcended the mere maximization of wealth and was grounded on a 
discourse on justice and equality. See Haakonssen (1981); Young (2005).    
10 See Carey (1837-1840, vol.1, pp.9-12). Both Carey and the other alleged “inventor” of reproduction cost, the 
Scottish-Canadian economist John Rae (see Rae 1834, Ch. X), defy standard labels as they were neither classical nor 
neoclassical. Reproduction cost itself is a notion partaking of both approaches in that it contains a classical element (it 
still relates value to production cost) and a neoclassical one (it is a forward-looking concept that, in some of its variants, 
most notably that of another transitional economist, the mid-19th-century Italian Francesco Ferrara, even admits of a 
subjective foundation: see Ferrara 1856). 
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For example, the 1886 volume of the Transactions of the American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers included a paper, by a New Jersey engineer named Oberlin Smith, about “Inventory 
evaluation of machinery plant”. Smith discusses the evaluation techniques a business should apply 
in cost accounting, the problem being to ascertain “the true value of property kept account of” 
(Smith 1886, p.433). The only correct answer, he declares, is reproduction cost: “The grand 
principle which lies at the root of correct evaluation, and which should govern the appraiser 
throughout all his work, is, that any article is worth not what it did cost, but what it would cost to 
replace it to-day” (ibid., 436, original emphasis). As a further example, consider an 1886 paper by 
Brooklyn economist Paul Davis that dealt with the big national controversy surrounding the 
outstanding debt to the United States of the Union Pacific Railway Co. One solution then touted 
was to foreclose the government lien and proceed with selling the railroad lines, but to assess its 
convenience one should first be able to determine the value of Union Pacific properties. Here came 
Davis’s contribution. He suggested making recourse to the cost of reproduction principle, invoking 
the authority of civil engineer and renowned expert in railway matters, Richard Price Morgan, who 
had already adopted this evaluation technique for the same railway company a few years before 
(Davis 1886, pp.68-70).  
In a sort of mutually enforcing feedback, the notion of replacement cost owes a lot to the history 
of regulation itself. For instance, the concept was employed as far back as the 1840s in 
controversies raised against the British Railway Commission about the evaluation of capital 
improvements.11 Accounting historian Germain Boer confirms that the earliest arguments about 
replacement cost in the US had no theoretical foundation or origin, but stemmed from rate cases 
involving public utilities and heard before regulatory agencies: “It was in the hearings before these 
commissions that replacement cost first received prominence in America” (Boer 1966, p.92). In 
short, railroad regulators used reproduction cost because engineers and accountants did; engineers 
and accountants in turn used it because some regulators had. Yet, in order to come full circle an 
authoritative judicial sanction was required. The Supreme Court was ready to oblige.  
 
 
II. THE SMYTH RULE 
 
By the last two decades of the 19th-century, engineers, accountants and even a few regulators had 
agreed that the present value of a business was equivalent to the funds a potential buyer of the 
whole business would have to expend to construct anew that specific enterprise, i.e., to the 
                                                 
11 See Pollins (1956, p.353). 
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business’s reproduction cost. This technique rested on the more or less implicit assumption that 
buyers in a free market always had the option of building, rather than buying, and should bear the 
full consequences of their own choice. The reference to free – that is, competitive – markets proved 
crucial in the technique’s success. As Siegel remarks (1984, p.222), under the reproduction cost 
approach, a businessman in a regulated industry would reap the fruits, positive or negative, of his 
own ability: if he had built his enterprise at less than its current reproduction cost, even regulated 
rates would guarantee him an extra profit; by contrast, if he had spent too much, he would suffer 
from his bad choices. This was exactly what would happen in the unregulated market, given that the 
reproduction cost always identified the right value of his business. 
Of course, calculating the reproduction cost of a railroad, a navigation channel or a public utility 
was no easy task, but still no harder than determining the historic cost, as required by the backward-
looking evaluation criteria. Moreover, it was a matter of factual inquiry rather than mere judicial 
opinion. This catered to the courts’ need to avoid excessive discretion. In 1898 a unanimous 
Supreme Court established the reproduction cost rule in the landmark Smyth v. Ames case.12 Despite 
mounting criticism (especially after WWI), and a considerable degree of ambiguity in the Court’s 
own wording, the rule would remain valid for the next forty-six years,13 helping judges at all levels 
to separate rate regulation from confiscation.  
The case involved Nebraska’s 1893 railroad rate legislation. With an opinion written by Justice 
John Harlan, the Court found the regulation unconstitutional: when set too low to permit the 
railroads a “reasonable return”, regulated rates amounted to an unconstitutional taking of private 
property. Factual analysis would have sufficed to reach this conclusion in the specific case, because 
the rates established by Nebraska legislators brought insufficient revenues for the railroads under 
any possible definition of “reasonable return”. However, the Court hinted at a preferred approach to 
the notion. In the key passage of his opinion, Harlan wrote: “the basis of all calculations as to the 
reasonableness of rates to be charged by a corporation maintaining a highway under legislative 
sanction must be the fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience of the public. 
And in order to ascertain that value, the original cost of construction, the amount expended in 
permanent improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and stock, the present as 
compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property under 
particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses are all 
matters for consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just and right in each case. 
                                                 
12 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). For the economic foundations of the constitutional jurisprudence that led to the 
Smyth rule, see Giocoli (2017). 
13 Smyth will be formally overruled only in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
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[…] What the company is entitled to ask is a fair return upon the value of that which it employs for 
the public convenience” (Smyth, at 546-7, emphasis added).  
These words were subjected to careful scrutiny over the following four decades.14 Taken literally, 
they merely offered a list of evaluation criteria that eschewed any commitment to a specific 
determination of the vague concepts of “fair return” and “fair value”. So, Harlan’s statement has 
been considered ambiguous at best and useless at worst. According to Siegel, though, this was not 
how most contemporary courts and commentators understood it. At the time, it was widely 
recognized that the Court had endorsed the reproduction cost approach to rate regulation.15 Indeed, 
all subsequent decisions on rate regulations took it for granted that the “fair return” to which a 
regulated company was entitled was the competitive dividend, and that the “fair value” upon which 
that return had to be calculated was the present reproduction value of the company’s assets, as 
required by the reproduction cost method, and not their original cost.  
One year later, in San Diego Land & Town, Harlan himself clarified the Court’s endorsement of 
reproduction cost, calling for a “fair return upon the reasonable value of the property at the time it is 
being used for the public” as the measure of just compensation, while rejecting the appellant’s 
request based on the original cost.16 Even more significantly, the next rate regulation cases – where 
the Court consistently applied the new method – were all decided unanimously, with opinions 
written by Justices as diverse as progressive Oliver Wendell Holmes and conservative Rufus 
Peckham.17 In 1903 Holmes quoted Harlan’s words from San Diego Land & Town to proclaim that 
“[i]t no longer is open to dispute that under the constitution” evaluation for regulatory reasons 
should be based on reproduction cost. “That is decided”, Holmes wrote, “and is decided as against 
the contention that you are to take the actual cost of the plant, annual depreciation, etc., and to allow 
a fair profit on that footing over the above expenses”.18 By the time of Lochner, reproduction cost 
looked like settled law. 
As we said, the logical underpinnings of the reproduction cost principle resided in the notion of 
competitive markets. Fairness (of values and returns) was expressly translated in terms of the 
                                                 
14 Given that the “fair return on fair value” mantra underlies all forms of cost-plus regulation, one may legitimately 
argue that the debate raised by Smyth continues today.  
15 Siegel 1984, p.227. Textual corroboration did exist. Reproduction cost had been explicitly employed by counsel for 
the appellant State of Nebraska, famous agrarian leader William Jennings Bryan, with the goal of demonstrating that no 
right to profit existed for the railroads (Smyth, at 489-91). Moreover, Harlan’s opinion quoted from an 1891 official 
report of the Nebraska Board of Transportation that, in admitting that freight rates could be lowered no further (as the 
1893 legislation would indeed do) without “doing violence” to the railroads, underlined that such a conclusion had been 
reached, “not by taking the cost of construction and equipments, nor the amount of stock and bonds issued per mile, but 
by making our computations upon the basis of what it would cost to duplicate the property at the present time” (ibid., at 
549). The Court plainly approved this method of evaluating the railroads’ “fair value” – the one more favorable to 
regulators in a deflationary period – and still voided the law as an unconstitutional deprivation of property.  
16 San Diego Land & Town Co. v. City of National City, 174 U.S. 739 (1899), at 757 (emphasis added). 
17 On these cases, see Whitten (1912, pp.26-8); Siegel (1984, pp.226-8). 
18 San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439 (1903), 442. 
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outcomes of classical competition. Smyth thus constitutionalized competitive values and returns as 
the fair yardsticks for measuring property and for protecting it against unconstitutional takings.19 
Classical competition gave substantive content to all those vague ethical or political attributes – 
justice, reasonableness, fairness – a regulated rate should satisfy. Indeed, its outcomes were 
themselves just, reasonable and fair.20 Under competitive conditions, the public would pay no more 
for a product or service than what would grant a competitive return to a freely entering rival – viz., 
the equilibrium rate of profit. The Court recognized that this was also the amount the Constitution 
should guarantee to railroad and utility shareholders. Competitive market returns, and only such, 
represented the morally justified profits that even privileged businesses like railroads and utilities 
were entitled to gain. Judicial determination of reasonable rates thus suffered no arbitrariness: 
competition, not the judge’s idiosyncratic will, drew the constitutional boundary between regulation 
and confiscation. Courts should just establish by factual analysis what the competitive return on the 
present market value of a given enterprise would be and compare it with that implied by the 
regulated rates.  
Remarkably, the kind of competition the unanimous Court had in mind in Smyth and later 
decisions was still the classical one. As classical economists envisaged, competition was the 
dynamic process leveling the profit rate and canceling monopolistic rents unsupported by legal 
privilege.21 Competitive markets were simply those where this process worked unhampered. Proof 
of their effective functioning rested in the tendency itself to the equalization of returns – the 
analytical core of classical economics.22 Conversely, the Court’s jurisprudence on rate regulation 
did not hinge upon the neoclassical notion of competition as a market structure made up of small 
enterprises devoid of market power. Much as it happened in antitrust case law, the structural view 
of competition was still far away from the Justices’ mindset.23 Yet, the notion of value underlying 
the Smyth doctrine was not the classical, wholly objective one, but a more modern conception that 
could pave the way to fully subjective assessments.  
                                                 
19 See Siegel (1984, pp.231-2). 
20 In the Smithian system of natural liberty, competitive prices satisfied moral criteria of justice and equality beyond and 
before welfare maximization standards. See above, footnote 9. 
21 Within the classical worldview, “privilege” was the necessary condition for persistent monopoly because it identified 
any “wealth that only certain individuals could acquire, usually through designation by affirmative governmental act” 
(Siegel 1986-87, p.58). Privilege stood in contrast with ordinary property, i.e., wealth “whose acquisition was open to 
all individuals, typically through competition in the free market” (ibid.). No monopoly could last in competitive, 
privilege-free markets. The dichotomy between market-based property and government-based privilege – and its 
eventual collapse at the turn of the 20th century – provide an alternative key to interpret the Gilded Age jurisprudence on 
economic matters. See Siegel (1986-87); Giocoli (2017). 
22 On the centrality of the profit equalization theorem for classical economics, see Stigler (1957). 
23 On the two views of competition as a (classical) process and a (neoclassical) market structure, see Giocoli (2014, 
Ch.2), and the literature cited therein.  
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In sum, by 1898 the Court had unanimously endorsed the strong connection between competition 
and property that lay at the core of classical political economy. The former provided no less than the 
measure of the latter, because free markets were the one and the only place where the value of 
property was determined. This free market value was, according to the Court, also the value 
protected by the American Constitution. One could not separate competition and property without 
violating the Constitution – and classical economic principles, too.  
Under this respect, the Smyth doctrine had momentous consequences that went beyond rate 
regulation. The constitutionalization of competitive markets affected the Lochner era as a whole. 
“The Lochner era began”, Siegel writes, “when American jurists decided that the constitutional 
notion of property included its free market value” (Siegel 1984, p.260). First settled in the railroad 
regulation context, the latter idea was soon generalized. All citizens were entitled, like railroads, to 
the free market value of their property. In Siegel’s account, even the central doctrine of the Lochner 
era, liberty of contract, emerged as a corollary of the constitutional protection of the competitive 
value of property (ibid.). Free market value is nothing but exchange value; the latter, in turn, 
depends upon the possibility of trading property with the utmost liberty. Hence, liberty of contract 
may also be construed as a necessary implication of the Court’s interpretation of the “just 
compensation” principle of rate regulation in terms of the reproduction cost rule – that is to say, of 
the ironclad link between classical competition and the constitutional protection of property rights. 
However, the apparent triumph of the classical worldview epitomized by Smyth also contained the 
seeds for its eventual demise. If value was not anymore an objective entity, but something entirely 
determined on the marketplace, as a function of a piece of property’s ability to generate a flow of 
earnings, and if the latter were nothing but the outcome of the property’s capacity to cater to the 
marketplace’s tastes and needs, critics of that very worldview could then argue for the replacement 
of a different set of needs that property might legitimately be called to satisfy. For example, it could 
be claimed that the flow of earnings property was entitled to were those stemming from its ability to 
meet a politically-determined social need. In other words, that value was a matter of policy and that 
the choice set available to policy-makers had more options than just the classical, free market one.  
 
 
III. SMYTH BESIEGED 
 
In the years after Smyth, federal courts were busy with rate regulation cases. Under the new 
doctrine, railroad companies could ask for injunctions against the enforcement of state-fixed rates. 
Federal courts of equity granted several such injunctions, significantly restricting state rate-making 
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authority. Unsurprisingly, those in favor of more extensive government regulation of business 
power subjected Smyth and its underlying economics to intense criticism.  
The reproduction cost method was attacked on pragmatic and theoretical grounds. Scores of 
economists, engineers and legal scholars joined the debate. The intense controversy, which would 
last until the demise of the Smyth doctrine in the 1940s, climaxed in the wake of the Hepburn Act.24 
The 1906 Act strengthened the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission, establishing, among 
other things, the Commission’s authority to fix maximum railroad rates. By so late a date, the 
classical faith in the markets’ self-policing ability had almost vanished from the economics 
profession. Hence, the economists’ take on the railroad issue focused on the allocative function rate 
regulation should accomplish, downplaying the themes of justice and equality that were central in 
the classical approach. Everybody still agreed that free markets would determine the long run 
equilibrium value of goods and services and that this would conform to production cost. At the 
same time, almost everybody25 recognized that in the case of railroads competitive forces would fail 
to push prices down to production cost and that there lay the rationale for rate regulation. Robert 
Harvey Whitten, a city planner who mastered the law as well as the economics, explained this 
rationale most effectively: “In the case of unregulated virtual monopoly the force that tends to limit 
prices charged to the cost of production is lacking. This creates the necessity for public regulation 
of the rates of charge of public service companies. The aim of public regulation is to accomplish 
what in other industries is assumed to be accomplished automatically by free competition, that is, to 
limit the price charged to the normal cost of production” (Whitten 1914, p.422).  
The regulator’s task was therefore to determine a rate that corresponded exactly to the “normal 
price”, which, in turn, should equate to the “normal cost of production”. Whitten defined the latter 
as “the amount which in the long run it is necessary to pay to secure the utilities demanded by the 
public. It is the amount that will secure an equilibrium between demand and supply”, and the former 
as “the amount which in the long run it is necessary to pay to secure the utilities demanded by the 
public. It is the amount which constitutes an adequate inducement for investment” (ibid., p.422, 
p.424). The allocative viewpoint was apparent: rate regulation should aim at generating sufficient 
profits to attract the capital necessary for future investment in railways, exactly as competitive 
markets would have done. The question was whether the reproduction cost method devised by the 
Smyth Court could actually perform this task, without triggering either under- or over-investment.  
                                                 
24 On the controversy accompanying the Hepburn Act, see Giocoli (2016). 
25 The main exception was no less than the father of modern railway economics, Arthur Twining Hadley, who remained 
optimistic about the effectiveness of competition in curbing monopoly power in the railroad industry, at least in the long 
run (see e.g. Hadley 1885, pp.101-105). 
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Several economists gave a negative answer on purely practical grounds. Reproduction cost was 
unable to fulfill its allocative role because of huge administrative problems. The valuation of 
present reproduction cost was a time-consuming process, largely based upon conjectural estimates 
and, above all, incapable by definition of providing a stable basis for fixing rates. Compulsory 
reference to current prices of inputs in the production process of railway services made the results 
exceedingly sensitive to changes in the price level. In particular, the inflationary process of the early 
20th century turned the method into a boon for railroads, by generating reproduction values that far 
exceeded the original outlays to build the lines.  
One of the fiercest critics of reproduction cost was Harvard economics professor (and renowned 
racial taxonomist) William Zebina Ripley. In his oft-quoted treatise Railroads Finance and 
Organization, Ripley borrowed from the practical wisdom of railways commissioners to dismiss the 
method. “The ‘reproduction theory’ contemplates an imaginary community in which an imaginary 
corporation makes imaginary estimates of the cost of an imaginary railroad”, he complained. “The 
actual, efficient sacrifice of the investor, as revealed in accounting and other historical studies, 
supplemented by engineering advice as to the adaptability and present condition of properties for 
the purpose intended, will count far more than the estimates of engineers as to what it will cost to 
buy land that will never be bought again, to duplicate property that will never have to be duplicated, 
and to build up a business that will never again have to be developed” (Ripley 1915, p. 356). The 
passage reveals not only Ripley’s distaste for the conjectural character of reproduction cost, but also 
his favoring of a backward-oriented approach like the historical cost method. This preference – 
which curiously mixed-up a neoclassical focus on allocative efficiency with a classical penchant for 
objective valuation – was shared by most economists involved in the post-Smyth debate. 
Practical difficulties also occupied center stage in Whitten’s analysis. He was especially 
concerned with the intrinsic instability of the incentives stemming from regulated rates when the 
latter were grounded on reproduction cost. Stability, and the ensuing provision of correct incentives 
to invest, would per force require a continuous adjustment of the rate of return applied to the 
outcome of the evaluation method, but this was clearly a cumbersome task (Whitten 1914, p.425).26 
Problems in administering the reproduction cost method could get even worse whenever one 
wished to apply the technique in a truly rigorous way, by following the so-called “value of service 
rendered” approach. The correct method, Whitten explained, should neglect the value of physical 
property and aim instead at that of the service provided: “[the method] involves a reproduction of 
the service rather than a reproduction of the plant. If the old plant were wiped out, what would it 
                                                 
26 As noted by a referee, the fact that even perceptive critics such as Whitten and Ripley were pursuing at the same time 
classical backward-looking objectivism and neoclassical forward-looking efficiency bears witness to the persisting 
transitional status of early 20th-century American economics.   
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cost at present to construct and operate a plant capable of performing the service now performed by 
the old plant?” (Whitten 1914, p.426). The difference could be huge in terms of depreciation 
allowances because the given level of service could be rendered even with an obsolete capital.  
Both Whitten and Ripley acknowledged that focusing on the service rather than the plant was the 
proper way of reasoning from a theoretical viewpoint.27 But they also observed that the approach 
would clash with existing accounting techniques (Whitten 1914, p.429; Ripley 1915, p.357) and, 
above all, entail insurmountable administrative complexity. In Whitten’s words: “As thus stated, the 
reproduction method has so many difficulties that it is practically never employed. The reproduction 
of the service involves not only the determination of the cost of the most efficient substitute plant, 
but the determination of the present cost of reproducing the business […] The engineering costs of 
such survey and estimates would be enormous” (Whitten 1914, p.427). How could the evaluator 
ever know all the details necessary to reproduce a company’s whole business? 
Inevitably, the reproduction cost method had to be applied less than rigorously. But intrinsic 
imperfection in actual applications undermined the main argument in favor of the method itself, 
namely, its being a more rigorous evaluation technique – that is to say, one less dependent on the 
regulator’s or the judge’s arbitrary assessment – than the rough estimates of historical cost. “Rather 
than providing the definite, clear, and simple rule called for by a functional analysis”, Siegel notes, 
“the Smyth v. Ames rule was an administrative nightmare and an inaccurate one at that” (Siegel 
1984, p.236). Many economists thus preferred the historical – also called actual at the time – cost 
approach. On the one side, it was administratively easier; on the other, by a clever use of cost 
multipliers it could be tailored to meet contingent necessities, such as the need to attract new capital 
in some parts of the railroad industry. 
Actual cost had the further advantage that “it eliminates or minimizes, through compensation, the 
changes of valuation arising from fluctuations in the level of prices in general” (Ripley 1915, 
p.349). This remark touched a sensitive chord with contemporary commentators. Opting for one 
method or the other was hardly neutral: “If it were generally true that public utility properties could 
now be reproduced at less than actual cost, the argument for the acceptance of actual cost as a 
normal standard for fair value would appeal very strongly to the public utility interests. As, 
however, prices of land, labor, and material have in general advanced enormously since 1896, most 
utility enterprises can only be reproduced to-day at a cost considerably in excess of the actual 
necessary cost. It is natural, therefore, that public utility interests should incline strongly toward the 
reproduction method” (Whitten 1914, p.433).  
                                                 
27 Also see Bauer (1916, p.571). Remarkably, technological progress occupied center stage already in John Rae’s and 
Henry Carey’s early theorizations of reproduction cost. See above, footnote 10.   
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The numbers were indeed staggering. Between 1913 and 1920 the US price level rose almost 
150%. Under inflationary conditions, the reproduction cost method effectively meant green light for 
railroads to charge what the market would bear, and a practical constitutional ban on government 
regulatory activities. The situation was the opposite of the time of Smyth, which came at the end of 
a period of sharp deflation. Falling prices meant that the method subjected regulated businesses to 
the risk of losing on their capital outlays. Accordingly, late 19th-century enemies of regulation had 
shunned reproduction cost, while pro-regulation interpreters had embraced it. Wartime inflation 
changed everything: now present costs were much higher than historic ones, so reproduction cost 
was very favorable to railroads and other public utilities. 
Scholars could not fail to notice. Princeton economist John Bauer was straightforward: “Gross 
reproduction cost is the standard of valuation which corporations are demanding. […] Under 
present high prices it would probably give corporations the largest valuation that could be obtained 
through any single basis” (Bauer 1916, p.579). The shocking reversal raised serious equity 
concerns. “[T]his change in the rate basis was merely fortuitous”, Ripley complained, “totally 
disconnected with the matter in hand. It would certainly appear more equitable that the rights and 
obligations of the companies should rest upon the amount of the investment […] actually created 
and placed in the public service” (Ripley 1915, pp.349-50). Actual cost was clearly preferable for 
achieving both the allocative and the equity goals of regulation. Whitten could thus conclude: “If 
normal actual capital cost were adopted as the rule for the future, accounting methods and rate 
regulation would be much simplified and the relations between the utilities and the public placed on 
a much more equitable and dependable basis” (Whitten 1914, p.436).  
The superiority of actual cost was not merely practical, but, some argued, also theoretical. A 
parallel stream of criticisms focused on a major analytical flaw in the argument supporting the 
reproduction cost method. As we know, the approach found its rationale in the equivalence between 
the market value of a business and its reproduction cost – an equivalence that was guaranteed by the 
opportunity for every entrant in a free market to choose between starting a business anew and taking 
over an existing one. Underlying all this was the principle of perfect capital mobility among 
alternative uses, a pillar of classical economics. The problem – as the best railroad economist of the 
time, Arthur Twining Hadley, had explained as early as 1885 – was that railroads were a business 
like no other in the past. Railways services required huge investments in fixed capital that could not 
be withdrawn. Hence, railroads could continue for a long time pricing their services at a level that 
barely covered operating expenses. Their rates thus bore no necessary relation to their capital 
investment: “the rate at which it pays [for capital] to come in is much higher than the rate at which 
it pays to go out”, Hadley (1886, p.223) famously proclaimed. This meant that observable market 
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conditions were no benchmark at all for assessing what it would cost to reproduce the infrastructure 
necessary for providing the service.  
By the second decade of the 20th century, Hadley’s analysis had become common wisdom. “The 
real cost of transportation”, Whitten observed, “can only be determined by recognizing the only 
process by which transportation service can be supplied, that is, by devoting capital permanently to 
the enterprise” (Whitten 1914, p.424). Capital mobility – and the related profit equalization drive – 
simply did not hold in the railways industry. Against classical claims, no entry/exit mechanism thus 
existed to bring either the market price or the return on capital to their “normal” level. The 
equivalence between the market value of a business and its reproduction cost was consequently lost. 
Or, as Whitten put it: “Cost of production determined by the reproduction method is largely 
hypothetical. It is not based on the actual conditions that limit the production of the utility” (ibid., 
p.423). The critique seemed definitive. Nevertheless, the Smyth doctrine survived. 
 
 
IV. SMYTH DEFENDED 
 
Though embraced by a majority of scholars, neither the pragmatic nor the theoretical criticisms met 
with universal consensus. Some authors still defended the reproduction cost method and rejected 
actual cost. For example, New York lawyer Edward Cashman Bailly observed: “As engineering 
skill and experience increase, and the courts become more intimate with the valuation problem, the 
measure of present value afforded by the cost of present construction meets with more favor” 
(Bailly 1911, p.545). That engineers were the group more consistently in favor of employing 
reproduction cost28 lent credit to the approach and provided the best reply to the pragmatic protest. 
“As for its accuracy and expediency”, Bailly underlined, “the fact that [reproduction cost] has been 
approved as the best means of determining present value by nearly all the great public service 
commissions in the United States, that it has been repeatedly approved by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, […] that it is given practically controlling effect in the more recent decisions of at 
least the federal courts of inferior jurisdiction, is answer enough” (ibid., p.546). His conclusion was 
orthogonal to Ripley’s and Whitten’s: “It can hardly be conceived to-day that a valuation would be 
undertaken without great weight being given to the cost of reproduction” (ibid., p.547).   
This declaration of faith in reproduction cost was supported by the continued allegiance to the 
method by federal judges. The best example is a 1913 decision by the Supreme Court that, 
                                                 
28 For an example in this sense, see Ford (1911). 
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notwithstanding the Justices’ refusal to apply it in the specific case, reiterated the centrality of 
reproduction cost for regulatory matters. Writing for a unanimous Court in Minnesota Rate Case, 
Justice Charles Hughes defined the outcomes of the reproduction cost method as “mere 
speculation” and “mere conjecture”; unsurprisingly, he declined to endorse them.29 But the denial 
only applied to the peculiar application of the method railroad stockholders had invoked in the case.  
Railroad owners had argued that, in assessing the reasonableness of the regulated rates, allowance 
should be made for the fact that the “right of way” (viz., the right to use land for a railway line) cost 
more than the land’s market value. This because the purchaser of the right, the railroad company, 
would find itself locked-in (in modern economic jargon) in its bargaining with landowners on 
account of its specific railways investment and massive sunk capital. The argument’s goal was of 
course to inflate the reproduction cost and, therefore, obtain higher rates from Minnesota regulators.  
The Court dismissed the thesis on two grounds. First, railroads had been granted eminent domain 
power over landowners precisely to escape these lock-in situations (Minnesota Rate, at 451). Hence, 
a railroad enjoyed a privilege over the land that already compensated it for the potential loss of 
bargaining power. Inflating the land’s value by recognizing its higher “railway value” would 
unconstitutionally sanction a railroad’s right to enjoy privilege-based, supra-competitive profits. 
Second, Hughes found it impossible to evaluate what the value of “right of way” through a certain 
land would have been in the absence of the railroad already built upon it. “[I]t is manifest”, he 
averred, “that an attempt to estimate what would be the actual cost of acquiring the right of way if 
the railroad were not there is to indulge in mere speculation” (at 452). The existing railroad could 
not be “obliterated” in order to recalculate the “railway value” of the land. Hence, the reproduction 
cost method could not be applied in that specific circumstance.  
Ripley eagerly jumped on Hughes’s statements and concluded that Minnesota Rate had buried 
reproduction cost for good (Ripley 1915, pp.355-6). Yet, this conclusion was far-fetched. The Court 
had actually proclaimed: “The ‘cost of reproduction’ method is of service in ascertaining the present 
value of the plant, when it is reasonably applied and when the cost of reproducing the property may 
be ascertained with a proper degree of certainty” (Minnesota Rate, at 452). Clearly, the Justices had 
no problem with the method itself, provided it was based upon demonstrable facts. Their decision 
simply meant the method could not be applied when grounded upon mere conjectures or, worse, 
when its use would grant constitutional protection to the profits generated by railroad privileges.30  
Minnesota Rate is just one among a score of cases where federal courts confirmed their allegiance 
to the Smyth doctrine. In the early 1920s, Justice Pierce Butler even came close to affirming 
                                                 
29 Minnesota Rate Case, 230 U.S. 352 (1913), at 452. 
30 See Siegel (1984, p.229). The Justices’ unwillingness to assess reproduction cost on conjectural bases highlights once 
again the distance separating their views from the core tenet of neoclassical economics, viz., subjective evaluations.    
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something the Smyth Court never explicitly held, namely, that reproduction cost was the only factor 
to be considered in determining a railroad’s, or other public utility’s, present value.31 Keeping into 
account the inconclusive results reached by the economics of valuation, it is thus unsurprising that 
the debate between friends and foes of the reproduction cost method continued through the decade.  
Clearly, no definitive answer could come from purely theoretical or practical arguments. As 
Siegel (1984, p.242) remarks, commitments to values other than the purely economic motivated the 
supporters of alternative approaches. A broader issue was at stake under the surface of a seemingly 
technical subject. Under the original Munn doctrine (see Introduction), government regulation had 
the potential to spread across several branches of economic activity. The “public interest” notion 
developed by the Munn Court was so vague that it could be stretched up to the point of establishing 
some general forms of public control over the economy. Decades of later jurisprudence by 
increasingly pro-laissez faire courts had significantly reduced the risk of undue government 
activism. Still, competing conceptions of private property versus public welfare returned to the fore 
under the guise of the apparently neutral choice between reproduction and actual cost. Rate 
regulation thus remained a key battleground in the war between conservative and progressive 
approaches to constitutional law – a war that only ended with the so-called constitutional revolution 
of 1937 (with a coda, for Smyth, until 1944). 
The history of economic thought may cast new light on this broader controversy. The early 20th-
century debate over evaluation techniques for regulatory purposes brings to the fore the difference 
between economics and political economy – and their possible irreconcilability. This is what 
happened in the case of classical economics and classical political economy, when applied to the 
analysis of industries that, like railroads, were characterized by massive fixed costs and non-
standard forms of competition. Both the difference and the irreconcilability, it is argued, offer an 
original perspective for assessing the economic foundations of the New Deal upheaval. 
By political economy I mean here a discourse on the relationships between individuals and 
society, and between the market and the state, which draws upon fields as diverse as economics, 
political science, law, philosophy and sociology – the whole bag, that is to say, of what today goes 
under the “social science” label. Political economy usually involves a discussion of the general 
principles pertaining to the economic side of human activity, an assessment of the normative 
desirability of the different behaviors, and a catalog of the policy actions furthering those behaviors 
that are desirable and deterring those that are not.32 
                                                 
31 Bluefield Water Works v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 679 (1923), at 692. 
32 In Joseph Schumpeter’s ([1954] 1986, p.22) synthetic description, political economy is “an economics that includes 
an adequate analysis of government action and of the mechanisms and prevailing philosophies of political life”. 
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Classical political economy was predicated on faith in competitive markets; classical economics 
substantiated this faith with, among other things, the profit equalization theorem. Yet in the case of 
heavily-invested industries, the latter could no longer work in the absence of its necessary premise, 
perfect capital mobility. A new economics was needed to account for new competitive conditions. 
But while the brightest minds of the younger generation of American economists were building the 
new theory, the political economy inspiring American judges was still that developed by the 
previous cohort of classical writers. Nowhere was the chasm between the allegedly eternal 
principles of classical political economy and those actual market conditions invalidating the 
theorems of classical economics so large – and its practical consequences so significant – than in 
the case of the railroad industry.33 
 
 
V. VALUE IS NOT A FACT 
 
Throughout the long debate over the Smyth doctrine, only one conclusion was unanimously 
accepted. Everyone agreed that a railroad’s market value could not be used to measure the validity 
of regulated rates. Market value was exchange value; exchange value was the equivalent to 
capitalized earnings; capitalized earnings depended on rates, including regulated ones. In other 
words, value could not be the basis of rates because rates were the basis of value. This circular 
reasoning – which was implied by railroads’ complaints that a given rate did not pay enough 
interest on the value of their capital – was denounced by both friends and foes of the reproduction 
cost doctrine. Whitten’s 1912 treatise may be taken as exemplar: “Market value has nothing to do 
with the rate question as thus considered. It is only set up after the rates are in fact determined. To 
be sure, the theory is that rates are based on a fair return on the market value of the road under 
reasonable rates. The impossibility of basing reasonable rates on a market value that is itself 
determined by reasonable rates is apparent. It is a clear case of reasoning in a circle. […] Market 
value is not really a part of the process but the final result.” (Whitten 1912, pp.54-5). 
The issue struck at the heart of classical economics. As Siegel (1984, pp.246-7) remarks, only a 
notion of intrinsic value could break the circular relationship between value and rates. This was 
precisely what the alternative evaluation rules – reproduction cost and actual/historical cost – tried 
to do: to break the circle in the absence of an objective notion of value. Choosing between the rules 
                                                 
33 The chasm existed independently of the obvious circumstance that a business like railroads, which had been heavily 
supported by policy-makers at all levels through land grants, cash subsidies, tax exemptions, etc. (see e.g. Perelman 
2006, Ch.3), was hardly the embodiment of classical laissez faire. Indeed, most courts reasoned as if the system of 
natural liberty ruled even in that industry.     
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thus did not mean selecting the most proper measure of a railroad’s value, but, more correctly, the 
best substitute for it. As usual, Hadley provided the most lucid statement: “it is quite certain that the 
attempt to apply the term valuation to the assessment of a rate based on duplication cost as a 
primary factor or to call the result of such assessment a value results in grave confusion of thought 
and many practical mistakes. […] a cost assessment neither produces value nor measures it” 
(Hadley 1928, p.176, 180). 
For classical economists, value was a physical phenomenon, an objective fact: typically, a certain 
amount of labor or the gravitational attractor of market forces (viz., natural value). This notion of 
intrinsic value was lost with the transition to neoclassical economics: “Value is not a physical 
phenomenon”, a leading neoclassical author like Hadley stated, “but a social one – not an inherent 
quality of objects, but a measure of their adaptation to social needs”. Markets determined the actual 
value of property, not regulators or courts. It followed that assessing value for regulatory purposes 
was “essentially a political” endeavor, “not a scientific one” (ibid., p.176, 179).34  
Within the neoclassical framework, the choice of the best rule to make up for the inscrutable value 
of a railroad was driven by the functional goal of approximating the most efficient allocation of 
resources without exceeding the boundaries of administrative feasibility. Luckily enough, 
competition provided a benchmark that catered to both classical and neoclassical sensibilities. The 
natural value of classical economists and the optimal, first best price of neoclassical theorists 
converged in the value determined by competitive markets. As we know, here lay the main reason 
for choosing the reproduction cost rule, for that notion made express reference to – indeed, was 
defined with respect to – the outcome of competitive markets.35 The “competitive” label was 
especially appreciated by American courts, which could find in reproduction cost a familiar 
reference to classical economic ideas, in particular to the equivalence between competitive and 
natural outcomes.36 When in 1898 the Supreme Court embraced reproduction cost as the 
constitutionally compelled notion of value, it had behind it a whole worldview supporting the 
choice. It was the worldview of classical political economy, where natural – i.e., competitive – 
values enjoyed a sort of ethical superiority over all others.  
                                                 
34 John Rogers Commons, the institutional economist, put it slightly differently. “All value is expectancy”, he wrote, 
because the market value of property is just the present value of expected income flows (Commons 1924, p.25). The 
outcome was identical, though: expectations of future streams of income were as immaterial as any other “social 
convention”. Even the policy implications were the same: any jurisprudential rule determining a “fair value” of property 
represented an implausible legal guarantee of the constancy of a future stream of income. 
35 Another way to say this is to underline that its competitive foundations suffice to characterize reproduction cost as an 
autonomous notion, regardless of its hybrid, neither-classical-nor-neoclassical nature (i.e., regardless of its being 
objectively or subjectively evaluated). See again footnote 10. 
36 The idea that, as the forces of demand and supply work themselves out, market (i.e., competitive) values would 
inevitably converge to natural ones was another cornerstone of classical economics. See e.g. Blaug (1985, p.39).   
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Problems for the Smyth rule arose under both viewpoints, classical and neoclassical. The trouble 
with the former was that the necessary reference to the outcome of competitive markets was 
completely lost when the rule was applied to the regulation of industries such as railroads, where no 
classical competition could ever subsist. This destroyed the only anchor classical economics could 
provide to ground reproduction cost in the absence of any other objective notion of value.  
Functional justifications of the rule, typical of the neoclassical approach, did not work either. 
American courts could not subscribe to a functional standard because deep constitutional reasons 
militated against doing so. Functional evaluations were the quintessential matter of legislative 
policy, upon which courts could not exercise judicial review without infringing the separation of 
powers. In other words, either the reproduction cost rule found itself a non-functional justification, 
in some “higher value” deserving constitutional protection – values akin to those of justice and 
equality promoted by classical political economy – or it would find itself bereft of any logical 
foundation. The distance separating classical economics from the reality of the railroad industry 
thus sealed the rule’s fate. 
Devoid of its intellectual mainstays, the very notion of property evaluation, not just the specific 
technique of reproduction cost, began to be seen by more acute observers for what it really was. 
Value was not an objective reality, a fact to be discovered. It was, as Hadley put it, a social 
convention. No complex inquiry could establish the fact of a railroad’s value for the simple reason 
that there was no such fact to be established in the first place. Take Justice Harlan’s list of factors in 
Smyth. These factors could no longer be a list of types of evidence to be considered in valuation 
proceedings because, again, no fact existed for the discovery of which evidence was required.37  
The consequences of recognizing that value was not a fact were momentous. If it wasn’t a 
question of fact, then value could well be a question of policy. This conclusion did not escape 
progressive scholars, who understood that the demise of valuation as a fact-finding procedure 
offered an invaluable opportunity to redirect values – and the policies determining them – towards 
goals different from traditional ones. A brand new kind of political economy, cleansed of any 
classical dogma, looked like a concrete possibility.  
In the new political economy, value would have no natural connotation; it would be a plastic, 
goal-based concept policy-makers could adapt to varying social needs. At the same time, property 
and competition, detached from the Smithian system of natural liberty to which they owed their 
ethical superiority, would lose their absolute status. They would become socio-economic goals like 
any other, the protection of which would always be contingent on utilitarian, cost-benefit tests. 
Indeed, if value was a matter of policy, property rights themselves would be stripped of their role as 
                                                 
37 See Siegel (1984, p.248). 
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safeguards and would become nothing more than means to achieve socially desirable ends – means 
that legislators could mold at will. 
Columbia economist Robert Lee Hale was among the earliest to recognize that the conclusions 
drawn from the public utility area could be generalized to all kinds of property. “[I]n regulating the 
rates of utilities”, he wrote, “the law is trying the experiment in one limited field of turning its back 
on the principles which it follows elsewhere”. Hale had a clear grasp of where the novelty lay: “We 
are experimenting with a legal curb on the power of property owners”. The law, he explained, 
usually “acts on the assumption that whatever income a property owner can get without fraud by 
virtue of his ownership is legitimately his”. But in the case of public utilities, “standards of what it 
is proper for an owner to get out of his ownership have to be worked out de novo”. The upshot was 
radical: “The revision of property rights worked out within the utility field may very well serve as a 
model, wherever applicable, for the revision of other property rights” (Hale 1922, p.213).38  
In the field of regulation, the new political economy meant acknowledging that the relation 
between a regulated company and the regulator was open-ended, amenable to being directed by 
proper regulatory choices towards any kind of social goal – be it the maximization of investments, 
consumer protection, or other embodiments of the public interest.39 It meant recognizing that only 
two kinds of regulated prices existed: those that were useful in pursuing the regulator’s policy goals, 
and those that were not. Utilitarian considerations – themselves subordinated to the specific aims 
pursued by the policy-maker – not absolute moral categories, should drive regulation.  
 
 
VI. “THE ILLUSION OF JURISTIC NECESSITY” 
 
The progressive jurist who most clearly understood that the world of classical regulation rested 
upon thin air was Harvard lawyer Gerard Carl Henderson. In the final pages of a long 1920 essay, 
drawing conclusions from his scathing review of three decades of regulatory jurisprudence, he 
denied that fair value – the pillar of the Smyth doctrine – could ever be “scientifically ascertained by 
observation and induction”. He deemed it “merely a cloak which conceals a process of arbitrary 
decision based on considerations of policy” (Henderson 1920, p.1055).  
Henderson explained: “The relation between the public utility and the community cannot be 
expressed in terms of a simple, quantitatively ascertainable fact, for the relation involves numerous 
and complex factors which depend on compromise and practical adjustment rather than on 
                                                 
38 On this aspect of Hale’s thought, see Horwitz (1992, pp.163-4); Duxbury (1995, pp.107-11). 
39 “Any value which is still to be allowed to a utility company must be justified on some independent ground of policy” 
(Hale 1922, pp.214-5).  
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deductive logic”. The Smyth doctrine thus rested upon “a gigantic illusion” (ibid., p.1051), namely, 
that “there is a fact which can be discovered, if we are only persistent enough in our search for it, 
and which, once it is found, will provide a mathematical solution of all rate-making problems” 
(ibid., p.912). Alas, this fair value, “the fact which for twenty years the [Supreme Court] has been 
vainly trying to find does not exist”. The notion thus deserved to “be shelved among the great 
juristic myths of history, with the Law of Nature and the Social Contract. As a practical concept, 
from which practical conclusions can be drawn, it is valueless” (ibid.; emphasis added).  
Recognizing the mythological status of fair value could not be without consequences for the 
judicial approach to regulation. Henderson dedicated amusing pages to illustrating what would 
happen in an ideal community, requiring a railroad system and having to decide how best to deal 
with a privately-owned provider of the service (ibid., pp.914-24). There could only be one outcome 
of the inevitable lengthy negotiations, to which everyone – citizens, shareholders, engineers, and, of 
course, lawyers and economists – would contribute: the admission that “[t]here is no generally 
accepted norm to which a contract embodying [the relation between the owners of a public utility 
and the government] can be assumed to conform” (ibid., p.925). Thus, “when both lawyer and 
economist have had their say, there would still remain a substantial variety of possible adjustments, 
each different from the other, and each nevertheless accomplishing the primary objects which the 
parties had in mind” (ibid., p.928). The only indisputable truth in the matter of regulation was that 
“the decision must turn largely upon considerations of justice and policy”, which can never be 
exactly formulated, neither juristically nor scientifically (ibid., p.1055). This, in Henderson’s view, 
should prompt the Supreme Court to adopt a well-defined jurisprudential attitude, namely, to 
“widen largely the scope of discretion accorded to the non-judicial body which in the first instance 
conducts or directs the valuation”. The judiciary should step back, because valuation for regulatory 
purposes had to “be regarded as a task which is largely legislative and administrative, in which the 
judgment of Congress, or of an administrative tribunal which adheres to the forms of due process, 
must within wide limits of discretion be deemed conclusive” (ibid.). 
Henderson gave specific directions as to what his appeal for judicial restraint should entail: “If 
Congress formulates general principles of rate-making or of compensation, the [Court] should not 
upset these principles merely because it is of opinion that a different formulation would be juster”. 
Congress’s principles should always stand judicial scrutiny, “unless so clearly unfair as to outrage 
the common sense of justice”. Ditto for the discretionary deliberations of any administrative 
commission “appointed to investigate the relevant facts, to negotiate with the railroad interests, and 
to fix a fair and workable measure of compensation”, whenever “the commission has examined the 
evidence honestly and impartially, and has given all parties a fair hearing”. Regulation was a matter 
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of “justice and policy”, not of imaginary facts; hence, “conclusions based upon considerations of 
justice and policy should not be overruled unless utterly beyond the pale of fairness and common 
sense” (ibid.).  
The “illusion of juristic necessity” that Henderson (ibid., p.910) blamed on the Smyth doctrine 
went beyond regulatory issues. Treating a railroad’s value as “a pure question of fact” conformed to 
so-called categorical thinking – the cornerstone of traditional legal analysis against which 
progressive jurists like Henderson were waging their war at the time.40 Ascertaining whether a 
regulated rate guaranteed a fair return on capital to the railroad was conceived of as a dichotomic, 
yes-or-no question; accordingly, the answer was amenable to a clear, bright-line classification – fair 
versus unfair rates – of the type categorical jurisprudence so much appreciated. That the decision 
could be reduced to a fact-based yes or no – never overstepping the bounds of judicial discretion – 
was precisely the illusion that, according to Henderson, had lured the Smyth Court into the 
reproduction cost doctrine. Exposing the purely conventional character of all evaluation exercises 
and, from there, the emptiness of any sharp categorization based upon them, meant showing that 
discretion was unavoidable, that no simple yes-or-no questions existed, that every decision was 
always a matter of “justice and policy” – in short, it meant striking a decisive blow at the 
foundations of categorical thinking. 
Long before Henderson another outstanding jurist had invoked the abandonment of traditional 
categorical analysis along similar lines. In 1894, future Justice Holmes had argued that the 
complexity of modern society required a jurisprudential move from differences in kind – typical of 
categorical reasoning – to differences in degree. Conflicts among alternative policies did not lend 
themselves to sharp, categorical solutions – the very fact that alternatives existed denied the 
possibility. A judge’s decision as to which of two or more alternative policies was the “right” one 
could never rest on absolute rational grounds. Law was a social creation, Holmes had proclaimed. 
Policy outcomes had always to be balanced before lines could be drawn (Holmes 1894, pp.6-9).  
With its trademark cost-benefit analysis neoclassical economics offered the ideal tool to 
administer differences in degree and balancing tests. The technique required that weights be 
assigned to individual elements of cost and benefit. While applying cost-benefit analysis was a 
technical task, requiring the specialized knowledge of administrative bodies, assigning weights was 
an eminently political activity, fully within the bounds of legislative powers. Courts should interfere 
with neither task, limiting their interventions to the few cases when, as Holmes famously averred in 
his Lochner dissent, “it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the 
statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the 
                                                 
40 On the “categorical mind” underlying much of 19th-century legal thought, see Horwitz (1992, pp.17-19). 
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traditions of our people and our law” (Lochner, at 76). The legislature, with its appended 
administrative bodies, rather than the courtroom, was the proper place in which the competing 
interests affected by public policies were to be balanced. Judicial deference had to be the rule; 
activist courts the rare exceptions.  
While Holmes never expressly applied this philosophy to regulatory matters, his support for a 
more liberal substantive analysis of regulation – in which rates would be evaluated according to 
their “usefulness” with respect to policy goals – was implicit. More generally, underlying his 
approach was the belief that classical political economy should occupy no special position in 
judicial review. The Smithian system of natural liberty was only one among several other policy 
views legislators might entertain – and an outdated one at that. Alternatives existed, including those 
entailing a more invasive role of the state in economic affairs, accompanied by a parallel limitation 
of property owners’ freedom of contract. This was indeed the rationale of his epoch-making 
Lochner dissent.  
Historically speaking, the Lochner era would come to a close when a majority of the Supreme 
Court endorsed the views of progressive jurists like Holmes and Henderson. In the case that 
officially buried a half-century of laissez faire constitutionalism, Chief Justice Hughes declared: 
“The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the 
deprivation of liberty without due process of law. […] Liberty under the Constitution is thus 
necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to 
its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process”.41 This last, rather 
categorical statement marked the end of the Lochner era. 
Another implication of the progressive view was the exponential rise of the role of economic 
experts.42 In the absence of a method to determine values objectively, the value question had to be 
avoided altogether and alternative forms of legitimization for government intervention had to be 
found. Society could be an alternative source of legitimacy. Yet society had first to be described and 
understood. As law historian Morton Horwitz put it: “Social reality – the Is – became the source of 
the Ought. Description was privileged over prescription. Value was to be discovered from social 
fact” (Horwitz 1992, p.211). This was the social scientists’ task. The 20th-century’s increasing 
delegation to positivist social science of crucial legislative, or quasi-legislative duties thus 
embodied the attempt to evade the value question by elevating expertise and professionalism to the 
                                                 
41 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), at 391, emphasis added. 
42 On the joint, early 20th-century rise of the administrative state and the economic expert profession, see Leonard 
(2015); (2016, Ch.3). Combining an emphasis on the experts’ role with the dogma of administrative deference – as 
Progressive jurists did – was not unproblematic. If no objective foundations for value existed and if every kind of 
regulation could be justified invoking political discretion, one could then question the relevance of the scientific 
expertise on which administrative decisions had allegedly to be based. I thank one of the referees for this insight.   
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status of main source of legitimization. Neoclassical economics was at the forefront of the task – or, 
at least, it should have been.  
It was at this juncture that the analysis of leading economists like Hadley and Frank William 
Taussig (neither of whom supported reproduction cost) could have rescued the Supreme Court from 
progressive attacks, at least as far as regulatory jurisprudence was concerned. A curious inversion 
took place. Economic theory at its best did offer a lifeline to the conclusions of classical political 
economy. Even bereft of classical assumptions, like perfect capital mobility, and results, like profit 
equalization, early neoclassical economics could still provide a rationale for deeming rate regulation 
unnecessary, thereby defending the system of natural liberty of Smyth and Lochner.  
 
 
VII. THE NEOCLASSICAL LIFELINE 
 
Despite the absence of free entry and the substantial immobility of capital, competition still drove 
the railroads’ rate-making practices, including the most despised of all – and the true reason of a 
large chunk of regulatory efforts – rate discrimination.43 This was the main lesson that could be 
drawn from the pioneering work of scholars such as Hadley and Taussig.  
Hadley was the first economist to link the necessary conditions for successful price discrimination 
– monopoly power and the ability to separate markets – with a simple elasticity specification.44 In 
Appendix II of his Railroad Transportation the relationship between traffic carried and the rate 
charged was given both a mathematical statement and a diagrammatic illustration by way of a 
traffic demand curve. The basic assumption of Hadley’s analysis was that railroads are profit-
maximizers: “The practical railroad manager has one general principle in this matter. He lowers 
rates whenever he thinks it will increase net earnings – in other words, as long as it will increase 
gross earnings faster than it increases operating expenses” (Hadley 1885, p.261). The principle – 
which in the Appendix took the form of a differential equation – led the manager to lower rates 
“until the differential of gross earnings on a particular line of traffic ceases to be greater than (i.e., 
becomes equal to) the differential of the operating expenses” (ibid.). Under the implicit assumption 
of elastic demand, Hadley applied the marginalist principle to conclude, both in words and in 
formulas, that railroads would seek new traffic as long as the increase in revenues brought about by 
additional traffic exceeded the increase in cost (ibid., p.263).  
                                                 
43 Of the three evils of railroad pricing – monopolistic extortion (caused by either sheer monopoly or cartelization), rate 
instability (often the outcome of so-called ruinous competition) and rate discrimination – the latter was widely held as 
the worst. See Smalley (1906); Giocoli (2016). 
44 For more details, see Cross and Ekelund (1980, pp.217-22).  
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Hadley’s was a competitive theory of rate discrimination, in that he explained the phenomenon as 
an essential part of the competitive process in the railroad industry – of the way, that is to say, 
competition deployed its beneficial effects even in a market characterized by largely imperfect 
resource mobility. The railroads’ financial health, their ability to expand service to new markets and 
lower the average price of transport (thanks to market expansion under decreasing costs), even the 
possibility itself of their supplying any service at all – everything depended upon the adoption of 
rational discriminatory practices. 
Even more explicitly than Hadley, Taussig foreran what is modernly called the second-best 
approach to efficient pricing. Today we know that in the presence of a multiproduct firm, whose 
overheads need be covered by total revenues but cannot be assigned to individual products, a proper 
use of differential pricing can raise total output, spreading the joint costs’ burden among more 
customers. The idea is that the firm would set each product’s price above its marginal cost, at a 
level sufficient to cover overheads and obtain a normal return on investment. An optimal set of 
markups exists that would generate the required total revenue with a minimum loss of output with 
respect to the first best. These efficient markups depend on the elasticities of demand and are 
known in modern jargon as Ramsey prices. Whenever total revenues exceed total costs, including 
overheads and a normal return, the firm is earning supra-competitive profits. Hence, the proper test 
for monopoly power looks at total revenues and total costs, not at the size of the markup on any 
specific product: even a very high markup is not by itself an indicator of monopolistic profit.45 
As early as 1891, Taussig showed a clear understanding of the technique and its implications. In 
his terminology, the most efficient way to repay railroad investments meant charging “what the 
traffic will bear”. The principle aimed at maximizing railroad traffic on the basis of the customers’ 
willingness-to-pay, i.e., of the different elasticity of the various portions of demand. Like Hadley, 
Taussig concluded that price discrimination – whatever its basis: freight classification, geography, 
or the amount of competition along a particular route – was rational economic behavior, and an 
efficient one at that. Regulators should not interfere with it; competition should be let free to deploy 
its beneficial allocative effects even in the railroad industry (Taussig 1891, pp.454-6). 
The bottom line of both Hadley and Taussig was of course that competitive forces could only 
work within a system that guaranteed the most complete protection to property rights and 
contractual freedom. Defending railroads from arbitrary regulation was not therefore a way of 
upholding their privileges – as progressive critics complained – but, on the contrary, the only 
available path for having competition destroy those very privileges, albeit only in the long run. In 
                                                 
45 On Ramsey pricing, see e.g. Viscusi et al. (2005, Chs.11-12). For the history of the multiple (re)discoveries of the 
technique, see Baumol and Bradford (1970, pp.277-80). 
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short, explicitly non-classical (viz., neoclassical) economic theory could be employed to buttress 
the gist of classical political economy, namely, the intangibility of individual rights on property and 
contract under the neutral policing of market forces.  
Yet, the Supreme Court never endorsed the teachings of top-notch railways economics. Lack of 
proper analytical understanding, or maybe sheer ignorance, made the turn-of-the-century Court 
unable to catch hold of the lifeline. A hiatus remained, separating the Justices’ awareness that many 
classical economic categories did not apply to the railroad industry and their continuing adherence 
to the philosophy of the classical system of natural liberty. The latter without the former could not 
survive, if alternative basis could not be found elsewhere. The stubborn application of reproduction 
cost, even in the face of convincing critiques like those by Ripley, Whitten or Henderson, testified 
to the Court’s inability to comprehend that, by sticking to a technique the foundations of which lay 
in discredited classical economics, it exposed its flank to a more devastating attack on Lochner’s 
deepest roots, namely, those residing in classical political economy. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The regulatory jurisprudence of the Gilded Age is a rare instance of an area of the law where the 
Supreme Court did endorse a specific economics. Although it did not fully belong to the classical 
tool-box, the reproduction cost principle was grounded on the profit equalization theorem, itself a 
mainstay of classical analysis. In this specific case, the laissez faire, anti-regulation standard typical 
of the Lochner era had thus both an analytical and a philosophical basis. Hence, at least in one 
quantitatively important area of the law, the Court did apply “a particular economic theory”, as 
Justice Holmes would protest in his Lochner dissent. Yet it is a testimony to the much greater sway 
classical political economy had over the Court than classical economics that the latter’s dismissal, in 
the wake of the new world of corporate giants and massive fixed investments, did not lead the 
Justices to lose their confidence in reproduction cost. For decades after its analytical underpinning – 
full resource mobility – had vanished, the principle remained at center stage of regulatory 
jurisprudence as a symbol of the Court’s willingness to solve the regulatory conundrum by 
constitutionalizing the free market. 
The Smyth doctrine perfectly harmonized with the classical system of natural liberty, namely, with 
an idealized economy where property rights and contractual freedom were the utmost values and 
where competition was always deemed effective, regardless of business size and entry barriers. So 
strong was the Court’s commitment to this vision that, willingly or not, it even forfeited the 
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opportunity of strengthening its rulings by discarding reproduction cost and replacing it with the 
more robust findings of early neoclassical analysis, themselves consistent with a free market 
approach, that economists like Hadley and Taussig were proposing at the time.    
When in the 1920s neoclassical economics finally rose to dominance and economic experts 
gained an enhanced role, memory of the lessons of Hadley and Taussig had been lost. More 
precisely, their views had become only one of the possible readings of the railroad phenomenon that 
a properly trained economic expert could entertain. Being just a tool-box, devoid of its own political 
economy beyond the basic welfare-maximization principle,46 neoclassical economics could in fact 
lend its services to any kind of policy goal. Granted the proper weights and time discounts, cost-
benefit analysis (a.k.a. Holmes’s differences in degree) could uphold various forms of regulatory 
endeavors, or none at all. Social welfare, resting upon utilitarian considerations, became the guiding 
light of public intervention. Legislators should simply provide the weights and then leave 
neoclassical economists to perform the utilitarian calculus in order to establish the best way of 
reaching the social goal implicit in the weights themselves.  
By definition, this approach clashed with the hostility to any form of special privilege (like 
favoring shippers over railroads) and the obsession for procedural neutrality (as when granting 
identical rights to employers and employees) that were the landmark values of Lochner era courts – 
values that found their ideal counterpart, at the level of constitutional principles, in the fundamental 
ideas of classical political economy. The latter did share with Lochnerian jurisprudence a 
presumption in favor of the individual, a sacred respect of her economic rights, a strong 
commitment to justice and equality, and the ideal of an atomistic, privilege-free economy. No 
surprise at that, given that both groups, classical economists and Lochner era judges, had common 
roots in the 18th-century classical liberal tradition, as embodied by the Smithian system of natural 
liberty and the American Constitution. Still, it was just a matter of time for progressive jurists to 
exploit the intrinsic weaknesses of a political economy no longer anchored to solid analytical roots 
to jettison it and propose in its stead a brand new economic worldview, one where acknowledging 
that “value is not a fact” sufficed to legitimize several kinds of government intervention in the 
marketplace. The very Smyth doctrine that well before Lochner had marked the courtroom triumph 
of classical political economy also caused the decisive breakthrough in the edifice of laissez faire 
constitutionalism.     
 
 
                                                 
46 Differently from the moral-laden classical approach, neoclassical economics prides itself on being value-free, its only 
guiding light being the maximization of (a monetary measure of) individual or collective welfare.  
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